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Since the late eighties a growing number of studies has investigated the economic 
impact of workplace practices. Stepping from the early case studies found in the 
management literature, the economic empirical research has addressed this issue both 
within- and across-industry, exploiting, where available, firm or plant level nationally 
representative surveys. The balance of the results is usually in favour of workplace 
practices centred on the concepts of employees' involvement, empowerment and 
autonomy. Practices like information sharing, formal or informal arrangements to discuss 
production problems, rewarded suggestions, autonomous team-working, incentive 
schemes and financial participation appear to exert a positive impact on the firms' 
productivity, and for this reasons they are also referred to as high performance workplace 
practices.  
Although the list and the broad definition of these practices is now commonly accepted, 
their measurement is still in great part survey-specific and this has limited somewhat 
cross-country comparison exercises
3. 
Consequently, whereas the evidence largely agrees that innovative workplace practices 
contribute to explain within country firm performance (Greenan (1996), Cappelli and 
Neumark (2001), Godard (2001), Black and Lynch (2004), Thomas (2004)), their relevance 
in explaining between country firm performance remains largely unexplored.  
Meanwhile, the topical debate on the productivity gaps across countries has largely relied 
on comparable data of country institutional contexts (OECD, 1997) on the basis of which 
numerous studies have investigated the role of the firm's external environment, mainly in 
terms of markets competition, red tape and state intervention (Nicoletti and Scarpetta 
(2003), Griffith and Harrison (2004)). Indeed, the question whether the institutional context 
is the ultimate factor which also explains the adoption of specific practices has not yet a 
precise answer. However, some recent related work clearly points in this direction; using a 
large multicountry survey on management practices, Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) find 
that the presence of firms in the left tails of the distribution, where bad managed firms are 
located, is for a half explained by the country degree of product market competition and 
primo geniture and that these same factors also explain a large fraction of the differences 
across countries. On the issue of what makes firms perform well, Nickell et al. (1997), 
                                                 
3 An exception is Caroli and van Reenen (2001). using a sample of UK companies, confirm the disciplining role of the market but also find 
that a good performance can equally be induced through different mechanisms, like 
financial pressure and shareholder control and that these mechanisms can even substitute 
for the market pressure. 
Similarly, we ask whether employees' involvement practices, which aim precisely at 
enhancing effort and hence productivity by motivating the employees through a better and 
more satisfying job, show a different efficacy depending on the institutional context in 
which the firms operates and more generally, if there is a relationship between the 
diffusion of innovative workplace practices and the institutional context. 
We explore these issues by using two distinct samples of manufacturing firms, one 
representative of Britain and the other one representative of two Northern Italian 
provinces; both samples of firms have been surveyed in the same year (2003) using 
largely identical questionnaires (the Italian questionnaires being designed on the British 
WERS) which allow us to compare workplace practices using exactly the same definitions. 
Beyond this practical reason, a comparison exercise between British and Italian 
workplaces is interesting on its own grounds. In the manufacturing sector labour 
productivity in Italy has flattened since the beginning of the decade and now lags behind 
the average Euro area; on the contrary, in the same period and up at least to 2004, the 
level of labour productivity in The UK follows an upward trend, diverging from Italy and the 
Euro average (see Figure 1). In the same sector, from 2000 to 2003, labour productivity 
shows virtually zero growth in Italy (0.1%) while it grows at 3.4% on average per year in 
The UK (OECD Statistical database, 2007 ). So, does the extent of adoption of innovative 
work- place practices help explaining the worse Italian performance or is the poor growth 
essentially a matter of institutions? For the British context, we also investigate whether the 
new workplace practices are correlated with employees' job satisfaction. The paper is 
structured as follows: in section 2 we briefly survey the existing evidence on workplace 
practices and firm performance for Britain and Italy and recall the different  institutional 
contexts of the two countries. Section 3 presents the data sets. The empirical specification 
and the results are presented in Section 4. The last section concludes. 






2.  Workplace practices, firm performance and institutions. The existing 
evidence. 
 
    The interest in topics related to workplace practices began with the adoption, initially by 
a few large US firms, of some innovative practices essentially aimed at the employees' 
involvement. The early research on the nature of the new practices and on their impact on 
the firm's performance had been conducted on a case study basis and still provides a 
wealth of information on the chain of events that results in the adaptation of new workplace 
practices although it cannot be generalized to a broader spectrum of the economy (Krafcik 
(1988), Womack, Jones and Roos (1991), Ichniowski (1992), Berg et al (1996), and Batt 
(1995)). 
Successive intra-industry studies have the advantage of improving in generalization and 
largely avoiding the problems arising from the underlying heterogeneity of production 
processes (Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997), Arthur (1994), Kelley (1994, 1996), 
Bailey (1993), and Dunlop and Weil (1996)). They consistently emphasize the role of a 
coherent system of new workplace practices, mainly related to the human resource 
management, as opposed to the adoption of single detached practices. According to these 
studies, systems based on flexible job definitions, cross-training, and team-working, along 
with extensive reliance on incentive pay, result in levels of productivity substantially higher 
than those obtainable using traditional human resource management practices. Again, 
these results represent an important contribution to the literature on workplace practices 
and productivity, but it is hard to generalize the findings to broader segments of the 
economy. 
In the last decade the inclusion, in some nationally-representative surveys conducted at 
the firm or plant level, of detailed questions regarding the workplace organization, meant 
the possibility to finally investigate the issue at the economy level. Thanks to a significant 
number of empirical studies the picture on the diffusion of high performance practices is 
now quite clear, at least for a few countries, though the evidence on their productivity 
effects is not always overwhelming and unidirectional (Osterman, (2000) and (2004), 
Godard (2001), Bartel (1989), Ichniowski (1990), Huselid (1995), Huselid and Becker 
(1996), Delaney and Huselid (1996), Black and Lynch (2000), Caroli and Van Reenen 
(2001). On the whole, the findings agree on a few points: i) a particular set of job re-design 
and employee involvement practices (reduction of hierarchical levels, autonomous team-
working, job rotation, information sharing, suggestion system from lower levels of the firm’s hierarchy, project groups, development of cognitive, social and relational skills through 
training programmes, incentive-based retribution systems, ect…) can positively influence 
firm performance; ii) the positive impact of such practices on the firm’s performance is 
higher when they are implemented in bundles (Milgrom and Roberts 1990, Ichiniowsky et 
al., 1997 ). 
    Britain is one of those countries for which workplace practices data are available from 
nationally representative survey (WERS 1998 and WERS 2004). The picture drawn by 
Millwards and Forth (2004) on the basis of WERS (1998) shows a diffused adoption of 
team-working, functional flexibility practices and problem-solving groups, all present in 
30% to 50% of the establishments, but a very limited presence of systems of these 
practices which are implemented in only in 5% of the establishments. Maybe not 
surprisingly, the labour productivity effects of the practices, if estimated using again 
national representative data, are also, overall, rather limited: Wood and Menezes, 1998 
and de Menezes et al. (2001) find little association between systems of involvement 
practices, at various degrees, and subjective measures of labour productivity; similarly 
Bryson et al (2005), again using WERS (1998), find that high-involvement practices have a 
positive impact on a subjective measure of labour productivity but this effect is confined to 
unionized workplaces and is not at all significant on a subjective measure of financial 
performance. On the other hand, studies using specific samples do find a positive 
association between workplace practices and either subjective ratings of labour 
productivity (Hoque, 1999; Guest et al., 2003; Guest and Hoque, 1994) or quantitative 
measure of productivity growth (Patterson et al, 1997). This could suggest that productivity 
effects might depend on specific firm characteristics or specific bundles of practices which 
are hard to pin down at the economy level. 
        Italy, on the contrary, is among those countries where no national survey exists on 
work- place practices. In the Italian debate, the interest in workplace organisation followed 
the 1993 agreement (so-called “Accordo di Luglio") between employers and trade unions; 
this agreement envisaged a participative industrial regime based, on the one hand, on a 
company performance- related wage drift (to be added to the wage bargained at the 
national level) and, on the other, on a substantial participation of employees and their 
representatives to the firm's life. The legitimacy of this new form of industrial relations was 
thought to enhance a reciprocal trust and thereby lower the costs of restructuring production processes and adopting new human relation practices. The existing evidence, 
however, is only based on specific surveys addressed at a local level
4. 
One of these surveys, which has recently completed its second wave, is based on a 
questionnaire designed on WERS's MQ. The first wave conducted in 1999 (Leoni et al 
(2000)), had been addressed to the whole population of manufacturing firms with more 
than 50 employees located in the province of Bergamo. The second wave, conducted in 
2003 (Leoni et al 2004), has again been addressed to the same population of firms and to 
the population of manufacturing firms with more than 50 employees located in the nearby 
province of Brescia. The extent of adoption of innovative practices that emerges from the 
1999 survey is mixed: some practices are widely spread, typically information sharing 
(75.2), while others, namely involvement in institutionalized mixed commissions, are only 
rarely adopted (30%). Comparing the first to the second wave, the diffusion of team 
working and financial participation remain almost stable (only 20-25% of workplaces have 
adopted them) while there is a slight increase in the diffusion of job rotation (from 25% to 
30%). As far as the productivity impact of the practices is concerned, the econometric 
results available on the first wave suggest that positive effects are favoured by high skills 
and by good industrial relations; in particular, team autonomy, consultation, information 
sharing, selective hiring and cognitive training increase productivity only if the firm's has 
good industrial relations and a relatively at organizational structure (Cristini, Gay, Labory 
and Leoni (2003)). 
 
  The different institutional contexts  
 
The evidence on the diversity of the institutional contexts in which the Italian and the 
British firm operate, has been thoroughly documented. As far as the labour market is 
concerned, Italy and The UK are at the two extremes of the employment protection 
legislation (EPL) ranking: Italy is among the strictest countries, both in the eighties and in 
the nineties
5 and The UK is among the most liberal countries (Nicoletti et al. (2000)). Italy 
also ranks high in product markets regulation (see figure 2). Djankov et al. (2002) find that 
                                                 
4 There are three different local surveys covering some areas of Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna. See for 
example Colombo and del Mastro (2000), Pini (2004) and Cainelli et al (2001). 
5 Lazear (1990), for the period 1956-84, and Bertola (1990), for the late 1980's, rank Italy as the strictest country in 
terms of EPL. A study by the OECD's Employment Outlook for the late 1980's, ranks Portugal as the strictest country 
followed by Italy, Spain, and Greece and a similar study by the OECD's Employment Outlook for the late 1990's, which 
includes Turkey, North America, and Transition Economies as well, continues to rank Portugal as the strictest, followed 
by Turkey, Greece, Italy and Spain. The study by Nicoletti et al. (2000), which does not include some of the countries 
in the OECD's Employment Outlook study, also ranks Italy third, after Portugal and the Netherlands, in terms of the 
strictness of regulations on permanent contracts. it is one of the most restrictive countries for the number of procedures required to set-up a 
business while the UK is one of the least demanding countries
6. According to a broader 
measure of product market regulations
7 Nicoletti et al. (2000) rank Italy third and The UK 
last, out of 27 OECD countries. By breaking up this measure into administrative burdens to 
start-ups, regulatory opacity, and barriers to competition, UK always ranks last while Italy 
ranks first in terms of administrative burdens to start-ups. According to the same data, Italy 
also appears heavily regulated in terms of state involvement while the UK ranks above EU 
average. To draw a picture of the institutional context specifically faced by manufacturing 
firms in 2003, a few additional elements should however be accounted for. Firstly, the 
manufacturing sector produces tradable goods, hence firms are likely compete in 
international markets where the degree of competition is similar
8. Secondly, the temporary 
labour contract surge has reduced somewhat the famous rigidity of the Italian labour 
market, by making it easier for firms to adjust their workforce. Finally, the strength of the 
pound in the period under consideration relative to the euro has probably penalized the 
British firms. All these remarks could indeed mitigate the expected role of the institutional 
context.  
 
3. The  dataset 
 
  The data for the Italy 
The dataset used for Italy is drawn from two surveys conducted in two provinces of 
Lombardy, the most industrialized region of the country, producing in 2003 over 27% of the 
Italian industrial VA (excluding constructions) and employing over a fourth of the Italian 
employees working in that sector. The two provinces together make up, in the same year, 
23% of the region's industrial VA (excluding construction) and employ an equal percentage 
of workers in the same sector; moreover their productive structure is well representative of 
large areas of the North of Italy and some areas of Central Italy, which make us believe 
that the analysis, although carried out on a specific sample of firms, can provide valid 
                                                 
6 An entrepreneur in Italy has to follow 16 different procedures to acquire the necessary permits to start a business, 
which is the same number required in Senegal, Ecuador, Romania and Vietnam, and well above the worldwide average 
number of 6.04 procedures. The corresponding number for UK is only 5. This study also finds, that in Italy the 
minimum time to start up a firm is about 62 days, while in UK is just about 4 days. 
7 This measure captures: (1) barriers to entrepreneurship (e.g., administrative burdens on start-ups and corporate firms, 
licensing and permit systems, existence of antitrust exceptions for public enterprises), as well as (2) state control over 
business enterprises (e.g., size of public enterprise sector, price controls in competitive industries) 
8 We find confirmation of this in both our samples where only 20% of the firms declares to have a high market share. 
The inclusion of a market share indicator in Britain regressions is positive but not significant and does not change the 
results. 
 results beyond the local industrial context and comparable to those obtained from the 
British sample. In particular, the sources of information used for the empirical analysis are 
the following: 1) a survey conducted in 2003 among the universe of firms belonging to the 
Bergamo Province Industrial Employers Confederation; 2) a very similar survey in the 
same year on all firms belonging to the Brescia Province Industrial Employers 
Confederation; 3) a longitudinal balance sheet data-set relative to both samples of firms. 
The questionnaires
9, which comprise various sections covering organisational design and 
work practices, were sent to 350 firms located in Bergamo and to 200 firms located in 
Brescia. The response rate was respectively 30 and 40 percent, implying a final sample of 
100 firms located in the province of Bergamo and 83 located in the province of Brescia. 
For the empirical analysis we combine these two samples given that the questionnaires 
are identical in the sections of interest and that the two provinces are located next to each 
other. The questionnaires provide us with detailed data on workplace practices and other 
important firm characteristics (size, sector, market share, etc ) at plant level
10. 
Information on value added, capital stock, accumulation rate, leverage and profits is 
drawn either directly from the Balance Sheets Collector (Centrale dei Bilanci di Torino) or 
from a huge database of accounts, ratios, activities at company level (AIDA). For 
comparability with the information available for the British sample of firms, we use only the 
financial information of the accounting year in which the survey was conducted. Finally, in 
order to match plant level practices with plant level productivity and performance, we focus 
the analysis on mono-plant firms: the final sample then comprises 92 mono-plant firms. In 
line with the population distribution by sector, almost one fourth of the respondents be- 
longs to the metal and machinery sector, 1% to the chemical one and 6% to the textile 
sector (see table 1). As far as the size distribution is concerned, most firms are of small 
size (50-100 employees). Although this group represents over 50% of the whole firm 
population, focusing on mono plant firms seems to reduce the number of middle and large 
firms and this could cast some doubts on the representativeness of the sample. Moreover 
previous literature widely stresses different probability of adoption between small and large 
firms and this could weaken the analysis on the impact of workplace practices on firm 
performance for the Italian context. However this seems not to be the case as the simple 
correlation coefficients between the number of innovative practices and firm size is 0.12 in 
                                                 
9 An English version of the questionnaires is available upon request from the authors. 
10 The sections of the questionnaires are the following: hierarchical levels, teamworking, industrial relations, hiring and 
selection procedures, extent and quality of training, consultation and information sharing, incentive pay systems. 
 the sample comprising both mono and multi plant enterprises. The descriptive statistics 
relative to the financial performance are reported in table 2. 
 
  The data for Britain 
 
For Britain we use the WERS 2004 Management survey. WERS is a nationally 
representative survey of workplaces with five or more employees. Our focus on private 
manufacturing sector workplaces, with 50 or more employees and with information on 
objective financial performance, drops the usable sample to 123 workplaces. The 
management questionnaire provides us with data on workplace practices, while the 
financial performance questionnaire provides objective measures on the performance of 
individual establishments for the accounting year 2003. The dataset also includes a 
subjective measure of financial performance based on the respondent's opinion as to 
whether the level of financial performance in the establishment is, relative to other 
establishments in the industry, "A lot better than average" "Better than average" "About 
average" "Below average" or a "A lot below average". The responses to this question are 
skewed towards positive responses, as usually the case in this type of qualitative 
questions. In the estimation sample, for example, only 9 percent of managers rates the 
financial performance at their workplaces to be "a lot below" or "below average", whereas 
40 per cent rates it as "average", 53 per cent rates it "above average" and 13 per cent 
rates it "a lot above average". Kersley et al (2006) undertake a careful comparison of the 
subjective and accounting-based productivity measures for the private sector in WERS 
2004 and find that the correlations between the two measures are modest. This is a 
reason why we decided not use the subjective measure and focus our analysis on the 
objective measure; moreover this choice avoids the problem of comparing qualitative and 
subjective measures across the two countries. The distribution of the firms by industry and 
by size is reported in table 3
11. 
A fifth of the firms operates in the metal machinery sector, another fifth in the textile 
industry and 12% belongs to the chemical sector. With regard to the dimension, half of 
respondents are of small size (50 -100 employees) and one fifth are firms of large size 
                                                 
11 We always take account of the complex sample design used for WERS04, which involved disproportionate stratified 
sampling by workplace size and industry sector. The potentially biasing effects on descriptive statistics are accounted 
for by using the sampling weights provided in the data set, these weights being approximately equal to the inverse of the 
probability of selection of each establishment into the sample. For a straightforward discussion of the importance of 
accounting for the sample design in analysis of WERS data, see Purdon and Pickering 2001. 
 (more than 200 employees). As far as the measure of firm performance is concerned, we 
use objective data of labour productivity obtained, for the British sample from the additional 
financial information available in WERS 2004. Unfortunately, this is available only for the 
year 2003 and will restrict us to a cross section production function. The objective 
measures of financial performance are reported in table 4: the value added of the British 
firms is, on average, 60% higher than the VA of the Italian firms even if the average firm 
size is almost the same; the British firms are however more capital intensive with respect 
to the Italian ones. 
 
  Definition of workplace practices and their diffusion among firms 
 
    The task of comparing workplace practices across countries is not an easy one 
essentially because there isn’t a precise and shared definition of what in the literature is 
referred to as "high performance workplace practices"; the problems one encounters are of 
two broad types (Cristini et al 2003). 
First of all, the definition of workplace practices is survey-specific since questionnaires 
differ across surveys and the way a practice is defined depends on the way questions are 
posed and answered. Secondly, even if the questionnaires were the same, the practices 
are still likely to differ in their implementation so that, ideally one should measure not so 
much what employers or managers say they do, but how they do it (Black and Lynch 
2000); this is particularly important as it is how a workplace practice is actually 
implemented within the workplace that determines the extent to which it can affect the 
firm’s  performance (OECD 1999).  
        Whereas the second problem is the focus of this paper, particularly insofar as the 
different institutions firms face in different countries may affect the working of otherwise 
similar practices (Greenan and Mairesse 1999; Millward 2000),  the first issue is solved, in 
our case, since the two questionnaires use equal phrasings to detect practices, as 
explained in the previous sections. Hence we are able to define a precise set of workplace 
practices and in doing this we follow Bryson et al (2005) and Forth et al (2004); 
specifically, we focus on the following three broad indicators: task practices,  individual 
supports, and organisational supports. 
    The first group of practices includes three definitions of team working: i) at least 60% of 
employees in the largest occupational group work in formally designed team (Team, 
hereafter); ii) at least 60% of employees in the largest occupational group work in formally designed team and team members jointly decide how the work is to be done (Team_joint, 
hereafter); iii) at least 60% of employees in the largest occupational group work in formally 
designed team and team members are given responsibility for specific products and 
services (Team_resp, hereafter). Task practices also include a measure of job rotation 
defined as a dummy equal one if at least 60% of employees in the largest occupational 
group are formally trained to be able to do jobs other than their own
12 (functional flexibility, 
hereafter). 
    The individual support practices refer to: i) meetings between senior managers and the 
whole workforce that occur at least monthly and where at least 10% of time is given over 
to questions or contributions from employees (meetings, hereafter); ii) information   
regularly given by the management to the employees or their representatives about the 
establishment's financial position and the internal investment or staffing plans (information 
disclosure, hereafter); iii) human relations training covering teamworking,  communication 
or problem solving addressed to the largest occupational group in the last 12 months 
(human relation training, hereafter). 
        Finally, the organisational support practices consist of all the financial participation 
schemes targeted to at least 60% of the non-managerial employees in the last 12 months 
like employee share ownership scheme, profit- or performance related pay (financial 
participation, hereafter). 
    According to this specification, the individual supports practices are designed to give 
employees the skills and information that are needed to work in an "involved manner" 
(such as working in teams), whilst the organisational support practices are designed to 
help secure and retain a stable and committed workplace (Bryson et al 2005). 
  Before estimating the effect of these practices on the firm performance, which we will 
discuss in the next section, we briefly analyse the extent of adoption at a certain point in 
time in each sample. As we can see from table 5, Italian mono plant firms base their 
organisation on individual supports: nearly 70% of them adopted information disclosure, 
30% Meetings and about another 30% human relation training. They have also a fair 
extent of financial participation schemes (25%) and of functional flexibility (31%). On the 
other hand aspects regarding working in team with autonomy or responsibility  are virtually 
ignored: less than one fifth of workplaces have adopted them. Concerning the British 
establishments, they seem to have a more coherent organisation where along the diffusion 
of the employee involvement (working in teams) we find also an extensive adoption of 
                                                 
12 The closer definition of this practice in the Italian questionnaire is whether employees are asked to do jobs other than 
their own.  some complementary initiatives such as human relation training and financial participation 
schemes. In this context the effects of employee involvement on firm performance should 
be higher, given the supports of other workplace practices. 
Using simple two sample t tests, we find some preliminary evidence on the 
complementarity between teamworking and financial incentives in both the Italian and the 
British context. The evidence is based on two results: i) workplaces where teamworking is 
simultaneously adopted with financial participation have generally a statistically higher 
mean value added per worker with respect to those establishments where these practices 
are introduced alone (see table 6); ii) the value added per worker of establishments 
adopting either teamworking or financial participation is not statistically different from that 
of firms adopting neither of them. In the same way, we also investigated complementarity 




4.  Econometric issues and evidence 
 
    In order to test the effects of workplace practices on the firm's performance, we assume 
that the production function for the ith establishment can be represented by the following 
function: 
 
) , , ( i i i i A K H F Y =                                               (1) 
 
    where all variables refer to the year 2003
13.   is the skill-augmented labour 
input where  is a high skill dummy and   is the number of employees. The dependent 
variable is the firm's objective value added,   is the capital and   is a vector of 
multifactor productivity related variables among which we include the firm's workplace 
practices. The log linear-specification of equation (1) take the following form: 
i
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13 As explained in the previous section, for the British sample the financial data are available only for the accounting 
year 2003 which prevents using panel data to estimate the production function. Notice in addition that the workplace 
practices for Britain are recorded some time after 2003; generally it is assumed that workplaces practices have not 
changed to any substantive degree during this spell of time. 
     where taskp is a vector of task practises dummies, individuals is a vector of individual 
support practices dummies, financialp is financial participation and  it ε  is the idiosyncratic 
error component. 
    In estimating equation (2) four major problems should be considered: 
 
 1) suitable and sufficient controls of firm specific characteristics must be provided for the 
estimated coefficients to be unbiased; this is extremely important, particularly if the un- 
observable time invariant part of the error term is correlated with other regressors, namely 
the inputs in the production function and in particular the workplace practice indicators. 
  2) Some variables are likely to be measured with errors (such as capital); and this 
measurement error may exert a downward bias on the corresponding estimated 
coefficients. 
 3) Capital, employment and output are likely to be simultaneously determined, implying 
endogeneity of n and k in equation (2). This should bias upward β1 and β2. 
 4) We only evaluate the short run impact of workplace practices on financial performance. 
This could lead to an underestimation of true impact given that some practices may take 
some time before influencing firm performance. 
 
    The  availability  of  only  cross-section information prevents the direct use of panel 
techniques, which could have easily solved our worries. Hence, bearing all these 
considerations in mind, we will skip the interpretation of the coefficients on employment 
and capital knowing that they could be biased due to both endogenity and measurement 
error and we will interpret the estimates of the effects of workplace practices on 
establishment performance as statistical correlations that could give some guidance on the 
true causal effect. Table 8 reports the results of the estimated equation (2) for the Italian 
sample. Models 1 to 3 differ for the definition of teamworking while models 4 to 6 include 
interactions terms. The use of functional flexibility is positively related to VA and this result 
is robust across all specification; teamworking also takes a positive coefficient but it is 
statistically significant only when defined 'quantitatively'; when qualifying teamworking 
either in terms of autonomy or responsibility (Team_joint and Team_resp respectively) the 
coefficients drops somewhat, specially in the case of autonomous teams. Of the two 
individual support practices, the use of meetings is positively associated with the firm's 
performance across all specifications whereas the top-down information disclosure shows 
a consistently negative coefficient. Human relation training is only marginally significant but negative throughout. However, the positive interaction with teamworking, counterbalance 
this effect and is particularly relevant in presence of output-responsible teams. Moreover 
the results suggests that the consistently positive coefficient of the high skill dummy 
already captures the association between human resource training and VA. Finally, the 
relation between VA and financial performance is positive but very low, in line with the only 
marginal share that PRP schemes still play in the Italian workplaces. These findings 
confirm, first of all, the relevance of high skills for the firm performance, a result that backs 
that of Cristini et al (2003) on the first wave sample. Secondly, they indicate the 
significance of some traditional task practices (teamworking) but also of some 'innovative' 
ones, like job rotation, which we saw increased in diffusion since 1999. However, 
advanced forms of employees' autonomy and empowerment are not yet significantly 
associated with performance although specific human resource training could channel VA 
increases through output-responsible teams. Thirdly, among the individual support the 
reciprocal information in terms of meetings is strongly linked to VA, contrary to the top-
down information. Finally, the practice of motivating employees by linking pay to 
performance is, in the Italian workplaces still far from bearing a significant effect on 
performance
14. 
Table 9 reports the corresponding results for the British sub-sample. As we have already 
said in the description of the dataset, we do take account of the complex sample design 
used for WERS04 in all estimations
15. Given that we are working only on a subset of the 
full dataset, we encounter situations in which some strata are represented by just one 
workplace. We remedy by identifying these single strata and combining each of them with 
its closest neighbouring stratum. The impact of the sample design on the standard errors 
is accounted for by the use of a linearised variance estimator (Bryson et al 2005). The 
estimated results indicate that workplace practices have, if anything, only a tenuous link 
with the VA. Although traditional teamworking,  meetings,  information disclosure and 
financial participation are all positively associated with VA, the values of the coefficients 
are rather low and not significant at the usual level. Advanced teamworking and job 
                                                 
14 The negative or low effect we estimate for some practices may in principle be due to fixed costs borne by the firm at 
the start of the adoption (influence costs, expenditure for consulting and for training, non-production during 
organisational changes). We think however this is not the case for our sample of firms: running regressions on the value 
added of the successive available accounting years, namely 2004 and 2005, we find that the medium run impact of 
practices on financial performance seem to be quite similar to the short run one Results are available on requests from 
authors. 
15 The sampling weight used is the FPQWTNR, i.e. the standard establishment weight for the subset of cases returning 
a Financial Performance Questionnaire. 
 rotation even show a negative sign. Analogously to the Italian case, human relation 
training is negatively associated with performance but in this case the high skill dummy 
does not pick up any positive effect. One possible explanation, as suggested in footnote 
(8) could be the contemporaneity between the implied training costs and the dependent 
variable, but we have no data to check for this presumption.  
On the whole, the results obtained so far indicate that the adoption of innovation practices 
has spread substantially more across the British manufacturing firms than across the 
Italian ones; however they also indicate that the practices' association with the firms' VA is 
much lower in Britain than in Italy. One possible explanation of this fact is that the British 
context, characterized by market flexibility and competitiveness, exerts a stronger pressure 
for the adoption of such practices; at the same time, however, the performance effect of 
the workplace practices is small, on the whole, as the market discipline dominates. If this is 
the case, we should find that in the more regulated Italian context the pressure to innovate 
the workplace is lower but the innovative practices, where present, have a stronger 
association with the firm performance as their effectiveness is comparatively larger given 
the smaller 'incentive' provided by the market. Indeed this is, prima facie, what we observe 
in the Italian sample.  
Notice also  that both for Britain and for Italy the mediating effect of unions, observed in 
previous studies (Bryson, 2005; Cristini et al, 2003), is not immediately relevant here since 
all establishments in Britain sub-sample we analyze have at least one recognized union 
and the same is true for the Italian sample, where union representatives are present in all 
firms. The inclusion of a good-industrial-relations variable as additional control does not 
change the results. Finally, it is possible that our analysis did not detect performing 
bundles if these are made up of a number of practices greater than two. The small number 
of observations prevent us from pursuing this issue further using these datasets.  
 
4.1 Counterfactual analysis 
 
        To shed some light on the first of the possible explanations mentioned above, we 
compare the average predicted (log) VA of the Italian establishments with that of the 
British ones and apply an Oaxaca-type decomposition method on the difference between 
the two. In this way we can quantify the relative role of two components: the difference in 
the establishment characteristics (endowment or variable effect) and the difference in the estimated coefficients (coefficient effect)
16.  If equation (2)
17 is estimated separately for 
each country, using Italy as reference, the difference in the average predicted log of VA 
between the British establishments and the Italian ones can be decomposed as follows: 
 
() [ ] ( ) [ ] ita ita uk uk ita uk ita uk x x x y y β β β ˆ ˆ ˆ ) ˆ ˆ ( − + − = −             (3) 
 
    The first term in brackets in equation (3) measures the contribution of the difference in 
establishment characteristics and the second term indicates the difference in the average 
value added due to differences in estimated coefficients (i.e. coefficient effect). On the 
basis of the results presented in tables 8 and 9, we decompose the differences in the 
average predicted value added into these two components. Table 10 reports the results of 
the Oaxaca decomposition. The diagonal components are the average predicted (log)VA 
using establishment characteristics and estimated coefficients associated with the same 
country; the columns give the effect on the value added triggered by changing the 
establishment characteristics and the rows report the corresponding effect due to changing 
the estimated coefficients. If we compare the Italian with the British establishments the 
average predicted log of value added are 8.67 and 9.65, respectively
18. If Italian 
workplaces are attributed the British establishments' characteristics, the average predicted 
log of value added increases from 8.67 to 10.17, i.e. an increase slightly larger than a 
standard deviation and sufficient to move the median firm to above the 90% percentile. On 
the other hand if the Italian establishments operate according to British context, the 
average predicted value added increases by only around 7% (coefficient effect), 
insufficient to bring about an important change of the position in the VA distribution. As 
reported at the bottom of table 10, the weight of the two components is very different: the 
variable effect explains most of the difference in the predicted value added (about 90%), 
while the coefficient effect accounts only a modest fraction of it. According to our analysis, 
the difference in the VA performance between British and Italian establishments in the 
private manufacturing sector is mainly explained by the difference in the endowments of 
inputs (high skilled employees and capital) and in workplaces practices and to a less 
                                                 
16 In our case we can think of the coefficient effect as capturing the marginal productivity of the production function 
inputs 
17 In this case we estimate equation(2) not introducing the region dummies for the British sub-sample to have a 
specification that is fully comparable with that of Italian sub-sample. We think this is not a problem for the estimation 
since the regional dummies are not highly statistically significant and the coefficients of the other variables are quite 
robust to their exclusion. 
18  Figure 3 reports the kernel densities of the predicted value added for both the Italian and the British establishments. extent by the institutional context per se. This is also illustrated in figure 4 where we see 
that the kernel density of the predicted value added for the Italian establishments is fairly 
similar to its counterfactual density, the latter representing the behaviour of the Italian 
establishments in the British institutional context. On the other hand, figure 5
19 indicates 
that when the Italian establishments are attributed the characteristics of the British ones, 
the fat left tail of the (log) VA distribution disappears and the firms concentrate around the 
mean value. Quite interestingly the effect does not impact on the right tail of the best 
performing firms: higher endowments in terms of skills, capital and workplace practices 
cure the poor performers but do not provide an additional boost for the best performers. 
 
 
4.2 New workplace practices and employees’ job satisfaction in the British context 
 
    For Britain we find that new workplace practices do not influence the establishment's 
value added, thereby confirming some previous results (Wood and Menezes, 1998; de 
Menezes et al. 2001; Bryson et al. 2005). In this section, we investigate if these practices 
are at least correlated with employees job satisfaction
20. Freeman and Kleiner (2000), for 
example, find, on US data, that  employee involvement practices have no significant effect 
on productivity but a positive effect on the employees’ job satisfaction.  
To address this question, we draw on data from the WERS 2004 Employment Survey and 
we match it with the Management Survey. The units of analysis in this section are the 
sampled employees in each establishment. We have data on our variables of interest for 
1,600 workers belonging to 123 establishments used in the main analysis. The employee 
survey asks workers to rate their level of satisfaction with respect to seven aspects of their 
employment: sense of achievement obtained from work, scope for using own initiative at 
work, the amount of own influence over job, the training received, the pay received, job 
security and the actual work itself. Each of these categories is assigned a rank between 1 
and 5, with 1 representing "very satisfied". Missing a question on overall job satisfaction, 
we sum the ranks of each of the 7 items mentioned above and take the quartiles of its 
distribution as the main categories of our overall indicator. Following Bender et al (2005), 
we estimate the following ordered probit regression model of each aspect of job 
satisfaction and for the overall indicator: 
                                                 
19 We also perform a one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test according to which the equality of the two distributions is 
strongly rejected. 
20 We cannot extent the analysis to the Italian sample because this is not a matched employer-employee dataset  
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    where   is job satisfaction on item k of employee i in the establishment j.  are the 
individual level characteristics concerning the worker and the working position, such as 
tenure, hours worked, education, union membership, age and wages
k
ij JS i Z
21.   include 
establishment level variables, i.e. size, industry, skill composition of the workplace and 
most importantly the new workplace practices. The results are reported in tables 11 and 
12. The coefficients for all the individual characteristics are omitted from the tables 
because they are robust to all specifications and reflect findings reported elsewhere
j X
22. 
As it has been found in the main literature in this field (Clark 1997, Groot et al 1999, 
Bender et al 2006, Asadullah et al 2006) earnings and hours worked are not correlated 
with job satisfaction, while education and tenure seem to influence it negatively. This is 
also true if we consider union membership. Men, workers with poor health and workers of 
lager establishments seem to be less contented. Interestingly, establishments with higher-
skilled employees tend to have more satisfied employees. More relevant to our purposes 
are the coefficients relating to the firm-level variables on workplace practices. Only human 
relation training seems to have a positive effect on our measure of overall satisfaction and 
on satisfaction on training, pay and job security. Functional flexibility increases satisfaction 
on training and pay. On the other hand, financial participation and information disclosure 
are negatively related with the overall job satisfaction and with satisfaction on the sense of 
achievement, pay and job security. Team working and meetings seem to be irrelevant for 
job satisfaction. Overall these results indicate that management practices per se play only 
a weak role in influencing job satisfaction. As in Bloom and Van Reenen (2006), we don't 
find evidence for the pessimistic view according to which management practices may raise 
productivity at the expenses of wellbeing at work but cannot argue, by contrast, that 






                                                 
21 Unfortunately the data tenure and wage are reported in interval-censored form instead of in a continuum. We   
linearize them using the mid-point of each interval. 
22 The results are available on request from authors. 
23 See, among others, Delaney and Huselid 1996, Huselid et al 1997. 5 Conclusions 
 
Using data from the 2004 Workplace Employee Relations Survey on British 
establishments and two comparable surveys on manufacturing firms located in the North 
of Italy, this paper contrasts the adoption of workplace practices in the manufacturing 
private sectors of the two countries and looks at the impact of new workplace practices on 
objective measures of financial performance. We find that: (i) the adoption of innovation 
practices has spread substantially more across the British manufacturing firms than across 
the Italian ones; (ii) the statistical association between the innovative practices and the 
firms' performance is lower in Britain than in Italy; (iii) for the British establishments, we 
also find that innovative practices play a weak role in influencing job satisfaction. We 
further explored the first two results by means of a counterfactual analysis which suggests 
that had the Italian workplaces the same characteristics of British ones, in terms of 
diffusion of practices, capital intensity and skills, their average predicted value added 
would triplicate. This would essentially come about by trimming the left tail of the 
performance distribution while leaving the right tail virtually unchanged. On the other hand, 
were the Italian establishments to move and operate in the British context, their financial 
performance would improve very modestly. We conclude that the difference in the financial 
performance between British and Italian establishments in the private manufacturing 
sector is mainly explained by difference in the endowments rather than by the institutional 
context in which they operate, although the latter is also very different. Our results agrees 
with Leoni et al. (2000) according to which about 80% of the firms in the Italian sample is 
still largely organised on very traditional schemes based on narrow skills, low levels of 
delegation and extensive hierarchy. This Tayloristic work organisation appears inadequate 
to fully exploit the potential of the complex and versatile investments in advanced 
manufacturing. Policy aiming at the diffusion of new forms of organisation through 
incentives to employers, together with skill improvements, could partly alleviate the 
problems regarding performance and competitiveness of Italian manufacturing firms and 
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Table 1: Size and sector distribution, sample of Italian firms. 
 
   Size (n. of employees) 
Sectors 50-100  100-150  150-200  ≥ 200  Total 
Metal and machinery  37.5  8.33  12.5  41.67  26.67 
Chemicals 100  0  0  0  1.11 
Textile 80  20  0  0  5.56 
Other 38.33  31.67  8.33  21.67  66.67 
Total 41.11  24.44  8.89  25.56  100 
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics on firm performance (Italian firms), nominal values in 
thousands of euros. 
 
Variables: obs  mean  s.d.  min  max 
                 
       
Average number of employees  91  159.94  147.18 50.00 1008.00 
          
Value  Added  92  7699.56  9208.35 40.90 60405.04 
          
Value Added per employee  91      50.52  33.96  0.27  234.214 
          
Capital 91  9121.55  19082.19 49.53  159444.00
                 
 
 
Table 3: Size and sector distribution, sample of British firms. 
 
   Size (n. of employees) 
   50-100  100-150  150-200  ≥ 200  Total 
Sector          
Metal and machinery  75.6  6.75  12.46  5.19  22.41 
Chemical 21.78  11.36  19.36  47.51  12.2 
Textile 61.5  14.23  10.38  13.89  21.76 
Non metal  65.13  3.25  9.17  22.45  19.8 
Others 31.04  17.18  19.09  32.7  23.83 





Table 4: Summary statistics on firm performance (British firms), nominal values in 
thousands of pounds. 
 
Variables   obs  mean  s.d.   Min  max 
                 
Average number of employees 123  180.41  338.96  51.00  10006.00 
          
Value Added  108  11984.47  44916.41  -120370.  476964.00
          
Value Added per employee  108  52.90  83.75  -100.57  1059.92 
          
Capital 86  154795.70 1999572.00 865  2.80E+07 




Table 5: Incidence of workplace practices in the manufacturing sector 
establishments, Britain 2004 and Italy 2003. 
 
   ITALY  UK 
   Percentage of workplaces 
Task practices    
    
Team   20  75.3 
Team_joint 12.2  37.2 
Team_resp 14.4  67.2 
Functional Flexibility  31.1  22.3 
    
Individual supports    
    
Meetings 31.1  17.9 
Information disclosure  67.7  58.3 
Human relations training  27.7  62 
    
Organisational supports    
    











   Mean va per worker 
   ITA  UK 
Nor Team or Financial participation  49.91  37.77 
Team  or Financial participation  49.84  51.57 
p-value (Ha: diff≤0) 0.5  0.24 
    
Nor Team_joint or Financial participation  48.8  49.79 
Team_joint or Financial participation  51.7  49.18 
p-value (Ha: diff≤0) 0.3  0.51 
    
Nor Team_resp or Financial participation  48.35  35.62 
Team_resp or Financial participation  52.4  52.66 
p-value (Ha: diff≤0) 0.28  0.16 
    
Team  or Financial participation  44.43  43.54 
Team  and Financial participation  107.5  77.9 
p-value (Ha: diff≤0) 0  0.05 
    
Team_joint or Financial participation  51.85  54.95 
Team_joint and Financial participation  48.9  32.34 
p-value (Ha: diff≤0) .  0.85 
    
Team_resp or Financial participation  46.47  52.99 
Team_resp and Financial participation  139.2  52.17 




























   Mean va per worker 
   ITA  UK 
Nor Team  or HR Training  46  37.52 
Team  or HR Training  55.77  51.38 
p-value (Ha: diff≤0) 0.08  0.27 
    
Nor Team_joint or HR Training  48.6  73.9 
Team_joint or HR Training  52.28  40.06 
p-value (Ha: diff≤0) 0.31  0.98 
    
Nor Team_resp or HR Training  45.69  66.17 
Team_resp or HR Training  57.29  45.6 
p-value (Ha: diff≤0) 0.05  0.86 
    
Team  or HR Training  60.89  66.65 
Team  and HR Training  36.71  42.31 
p-value (Ha: diff≤0) 0.9  0.91 
    
Team_joint or HR Training  56.01  46.03 
Team_joint and HR Training  28.94  32.16 
p-value (Ha: diff≤0) 0.95  0.91 
    
Team_resp or HR Training  60.09  47.14 
Team_resp and HR Training  43.26  44.49 





















Table 8: The effects of workplace practices on value added, Italian sample. 
 
    Model1  Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 
                    
ln  N  0.93***  0.94*** 0.87*** 0.88*** 0.97*** 0.79*** 
 (0.14)  (0.20)  (0.14)  (0.12) (0.19) (0.11)   
ln  K  0.39***  0.34*** 0.38*** 0.40*** 0.32*** 0.41*** 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)   
High  skilled  0.45**  0.53** 0.44** 0.37** 0.50**  0.22 
 (0.18)  (0.23)  (0.19)  (0.17) (0.23) (0.17)   
Team  0.50**     0.36    
  (0.23)     (0.24)    
Team_joint    0.19    0.04  
    (0.25)    (0.22)  
Team_resp     0.37    0.02 
     (0.27)    (0.18)   
Team*financialp       --0.12    
       (0.40)    
Team*hrtrain       0.37    
       (0.31)    
Team_joint*financialp        --0.57   
        ( 0 . 3 9 )    
Team_joint*hrtrain        0.59   
        ( 0 . 3 9 )    
Team_resp*financialp         0.30 
         ( 0 . 6 5 )    
Team_resp*hrtrain         0.87*** 
         ( 0 . 2 8 )    
Functional  flexibility  0.43***  0.44*** 0.46*** 0.41*** 0.40** 0.47*** 
 (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)   
Meetings 0.22**  0.25**  0.26**  0.22*  0.30**  0.20 
 (0.10)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.11) (0.13) (0.12)   
Information disclosure  --0.51***  --0.40*  --0.41**  --0.46***  --0.40**  --0.33** 
 (0.18)  (0.20)  (0.18)  (0.16) (0.20) (0.16)   
Human relations training  --0.26  --0.32  --0.29  --0.38*  --0.44  --0.48* 
 (0.18)  (0.24)  (0.22)  (0.21) (0.27) (0.24)   
Financial participation  0.17  0.17 0.16 0.22 0.22 0.16 
 (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.14) (0.14) (0.13)   
R  sq.  0.94  0.93 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.94 
N  78  78 78 78 78 78 
 
 
Note: All regressions include industry dummies. Estimates are obtained using weighted least squares, the weights being 











Table 9: The effects of workplace practices on value added, British sample. 
 
 
    Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 
                    
ln  N  0.96*** 0.91*** 0.90*** 0.97*** 0.90*** 0.92*** 
  (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)   
ln  K  0.13* 0.15** 0.16** 0.13* 0.16** 0.16** 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)   
High  skilled  --0.10 --0.12 --0.10 --0.06 --0.08 --0.15 
  (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.21) (0.24) (0.24)   
Team  0.23    0.50    
  (0.19)    (0.33)    
Team_joint   --0.11    --0.17  
   (0.19)    (0.29)  
Team_resp     --0.10    --0.38 
     (0.20)    (0.33)   
Team*financialp      0.23    
      ( 0 . 3 6 )     
Team*hrtrain      --0.70    
      ( 0 . 4 4 )     
Team_joint*financialp       --0.29   
       ( 0 . 3 4 )    
Team_joint*hrtrain       0.25   
       ( 0 . 3 3 )    
Team_resp*financialp        --0.08 
        ( 0 . 3 6 )    
Team_resp*hrtrain       0.49 
        ( 0 . 3 8 )    
Functional flexibility  --0.24  --0.26 --0.28 --0.21 --0.22 --0.30 
  (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.25) (0.25) (0.28)   
Meetings  0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.14 
  (0.28) (0.27) (0.29) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29)   
Information disclosure  0.32 0.29 0.34 0.29 0.30 0.36 
  (0.26) (0.28) (0.25) (0.26) (0.28) (0.24)   
Human relations training  --0.55**  --0.42*  --0.42*  --0.07  --0.49  --0.64** 
  (0.27) (0.23) (0.23) (0.28) (0.30) (0.31)   
Financial participation  0.32 0.34 0.35 0.10 0.43 0.38 
  (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.33) (0.29) (0.33)   
R  sq.  0.68 0.67 0.67 0.69 0.68 0.68 
N  81 81 81 81 81 81 
 

























Table 10: Oaxaca decomposition of the average predicted value added. 
 
   Coefficients 
Characteristics Italy  Britain 
    
Italy 8.666  8.733 
Britain 10.175  9.657 
    
Oxaca decomposition       
    
1) Variable effect  0.923   
2) Coefficient effect  0.067   
    


















 Table 11: The effects of workplace practices on employees’ job satisfaction, British sample. 
 
    Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10  Model11  Model12 
                                      
High skilled    --0.12       --0.12      --0.14*      --0.17**     --0.17**     --0.17**     --0.14*      --0.14*      --0.15*      --0.13*      --0.13*      --0.12*   
    (0.07)       (0.07)      (0.08)      (0.07)      (0.07)      (0.07)       (0.07)      (0.07)      (0.08)      (0.07)      (0.07)      (0.07)    
Team(1)      0.10                               0.02                               0.06                               0.05                            
    (0.06)                             (0.05)                            (0.05)                            (0.08)                           
Team(2)                --0.10                            --0.05                             --0.07                            --0.09                
                (0.08)                            (0.08)                             (0.07)                            (0.08)                
Team(3)                             0.13*                            --0.04                                0.06                             --0.06    
                           (0.07)                            (0.06)                              (0.06)                            (0.08)    
Functional flexibility    --0.04         0.03         0.00         0.02         0.04         0.03         0.06         0.08         0.06       --0.10      --0.07      --0.09    
    (0.07)       (0.08)      (0.07)      (0.07)      (0.07)      (0.07)       (0.07)      (0.08)      (0.07)      (0.08)      (0.09)      (0.08)    
Briefings      0.13**       0.11         0.13**       0.07         0.06         0.05         0.08         0.07         0.08         0.10         0.09         0.08    
    (0.06)       (0.07)      (0.06)      (0.06)      (0.06)      (0.06)       (0.05)      (0.05)      (0.05)      (0.09)      (0.09)      (0.09)    
Information disclosure      0.10         0.13**       0.09         0.06         0.07         0.08       --0.02        0.00       --0.02        0.11         0.13         0.14*   
    (0.07)       (0.06)      (0.06)      (0.06)      (0.06)      (0.06)       (0.05)      (0.05)      (0.06)      (0.08)      (0.08)      (0.08)    
Human relations training    --0.10       --0.06      --0.08      --0.05      --0.04      --0.05         0.00         0.02         0.01       --0.24***    --0.23***    --0.24*** 
    (0.07)       (0.07)      (0.07)      (0.06)      (0.06)      (0.06)       (0.07)      (0.07)      (0.07)      (0.08)      (0.08)      (0.08)    
Financial participation      0.15**       0.12*        0.16**       0.06         0.04         0.05         0.09         0.06         0.09         0.10         0.06         0.09    
    (0.06)       (0.06)      (0.06)      (0.06)      (0.06)      (0.06)       (0.06)      (0.06)      (0.06)      (0.07)      (0.07)      (0.07)    




Notes: All regressions include relevant individual characteristics (tenure, log of hours worked, log of weekly wages, gender, age dummies, whether a union member, whether has 
dependants, schooling dummies, whether a supervisor, health status), and establishment level variables (size, industry and regional dummies). Model1-Model3(Sense of 






 Table 12: The effects of workplace practices on employees’ job satisfaction, British sample. 
 
    Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10  Model11  Model12 
                                      
High skilled      0.06         0.06         0.07         0.21*        0.21*        0.20*        0.03         0.03         0.02       --0.04      --0.04      --0.04   
    (0.08)       (0.08)      (0.08)      (0.11)      (0.11)      (0.11)      (0.07)       (0.07)      (0.08)      (0.07)      (0.07)      (0.07)   
Team(1)    --0.05                                 0.14                               0.04                               0.04                          
    (0.07)                              (0.10)                            (0.06)                             (0.07)                          
Team(2)                --0.18*                              0.08                              --0.12                            --0.15              
                (0.09)                            (0.13)                             (0.08)                            (0.10)              
Team(3)                            --0.11                              0.04                                0.04                             --0.01   
                            (0.08)                             (0.11)                             (0.07)                            (0.08)   
Functional flexibility    --0.16       --0.12      --0.16*        0.05         0.05         0.07         0.03         0.06         0.03       --0.04      --0.00      --0.04   
    (0.10)       (0.10)      (0.09)      (0.10)      (0.10)      (0.09)      (0.07)       (0.07)      (0.07)      (0.08)      (0.08)      (0.08)   
Briefings      0.05         0.06         0.03         0.02       --0.01      --0.00        0.05         0.05         0.05         0.10         0.09         0.08    
    (0.09)       (0.09)      (0.09)      (0.13)      (0.13)      (0.13)      (0.07)       (0.07)      (0.07)      (0.09)      (0.10)      (0.09)   
Information disclosure      0.16**       0.16**       0.18**       0.16         0.20*        0.19         0.14**       0.16***      0.14**       0.15**       0.17**       0.16*   
    (0.08)       (0.07)      (0.08)      (0.11)      (0.10)      (0.12)      (0.05)       (0.05)      (0.06)      (0.07)      (0.07)      (0.08)   
Human relations training    --0.17**     --0.15*      --0.18**     --0.19*      --0.19*      --0.17*      --0.10       --0.08      --0.10      --0.15*      --0.13*      --0.15*   
    (0.08)       (0.08)      (0.08)      (0.10)      (0.10)      (0.10)      (0.06)       (0.07)      (0.07)      (0.08)      (0.07)      (0.08)   
Financial participation      0.15**       0.10         0.15**       0.20**       0.21**       0.19**       0.06         0.02         0.06         0.16**       0.11         0.16**  
    (0.06)       (0.07)      (0.06)      (0.09)      (0.10)      (0.09)      (0.06)       (0.06)      (0.06)      (0.07)      (0.07)      (0.07)   
N      1614         1614        1614        1566        1566        1566        1616         1616        1616        1524        1524        1524   
 
Notes: All regressions include relevant individual characteristics (tenure, log of hours worked, log of weekly wages, gender, age dummies, whether a union member, whether has 
dependants, schooling dummies, whether a supervisor, health status), and establishment level variables (size, industry and regional dummies). Model1-Model3(Pay); Model4-



















































Fig.4: Kernel density of the predicted value added for Italian establishments and its 

























Fig.5: Kernel density of the predicted value added for Italian establishments and its 
counterfactual if they were attributed British establishments characteristics. 
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